Immunity
A protocol is t-immune if the payoffs of "good" agents are not affected by the actions of up to t other agents.
Somewhat like Byzantine agreement in distributed computing.
Good agents reach agreement despite up to t faulty agents.
A (k, t)-robust protocol tolerates coalitions of size k and is t-immune.
Nash equilibrium = (1,0)-robustness
In general, (k, t)-robust equilibria don't exist they can be obtained with the help of mediators
Mediators
Consider an auction where people do not want to bid publicly public bidding reveals useful information don't want to do this in bidding for, e.g., oil drilling rights If there were a mediator (trusted third party), we'd be all set . . .
Distributed computing example: Byzantine agreement

Implementing Mediators
Can we eliminate the mediator? If so, when? Work in economics: implementing mediators with "cheap talk" [Myerson, Forges, . . . ] "implementation" means that if a NE can be achieved with a mediator, the same NE can be achieved without Work in CS: multi-party computation [Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Goldreich, Micali, Wigderson, . . . ] "implementation" means that "good" players follow the recommended protocol; "bad" players can do anything they like By considering (k, t)-robust equilibria, we can generalize the work in both CS and economics.
Typical results
If n > 3k + 3t, a (k, t)-robust strategy σ with a mediator can be implemented using cheap talk.
No knowledge of other agents' utilities required
The protocol has bounded running time that does not depend on the utilities.
Can't do this if n ≤ 3k + 3t.
If n > 2k + 3t, agents' utilities are known, and there is a punishment strategy (a way of punishing someone caught deviating), then we can implement a mediator Can't do this if n ≤ 2k + 3t or no punishment strategy Unbounded running time required (constant expected time).
If n > 2k + 2t and a broadcast facility is available, can ǫ-implement a mediator.
Can't do it if n ≤ 2k + 2t.
If n > k + t, assuming cryptography, polynomially-bounded players, a (k + t)-punishment strategy, and a PKI, then can ǫ-implement mediators using cheap talk.
Note how standard distributed computing assumptions make a big difference to implementation! Bottom line: We need solution concepts that take coalitions and fault-tolerance seriously.
Making Computation Costly
Work on computational NE joint with Rafael Pass.
Example: You are given a number n-bit number x.
You can guess whether it's prime, or play safe and say nothing.
If you guess right, you get $10; if you guess wrong, you lose $10; if you play safe, you get $1.
Only one NE in this 1-player game: giving the right answer.
Computation is costless
That doesn't seem descriptively accurate! The idea of making computation cost part of equilibrium notion goes back to Rubinstein [1985] .
He used finite automata, charged for size of automaton used
A More General Framework
We consider Bayesian games:
Each agent has a type, chosen according to some distribution
The type represents agent's private information (e.g., salary)
Agents choose a Turing machine (TM)
Associated with each TM M and type t is its complexity
The complexity of running M on t Each agent i gets a utility depending on the profile of types, outputs (M (t)), complexities I might just want to get my output faster than you Can then define Nash Equilibrium as usual.
The good news
The addition of complexities allows us to capture important features:
In the primality testing game, for a large input, you'll play safe because of the cost of computation Can capture overhead in switching strategies Can explain some experimentally-observed results.
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma:
Suppose we play Prisoner's Dilemma a fixed number k times.
The only NE is to always defect People typically cooperate (and do better than "rational" agents who play NE)! Suppose there is a small cost to memory and a discount factor > .5.
Then tit-for-tat gives a NE if k is large enough
Tit-for-tat: start by cooperating, then at step m + 1 do what the other player did at step m.
In equilibrium, both players cooperate throughout the game This remains true even if only one player has a cost for memory!
The bad news?
NE might not exist.
Consider roshambo (rock-paper-scissors)
Unique NE: randomize 1/3-1/3-1/3
But suppose we charge for randomization deterministic strategies are free Then there's no NE!
The best response to a randomized strategy is a deterministic strategy But perhaps this is not so bad:
Taking computation into account should cause us to rethink things! Two approaches for dealing with "deviating" players are intimately connected: NE and zero-knowledge simulation
Redefining Protocol Security
(Lack of) Awareness
Work on awareness is joint with Leandro Rêgo.
Standard game theory models assume that the structure of the game is common knowledge among the players.
This includes the possible moves and the set of players 
